





FIFTY SHADES OF STATE LEGISLATURES: 


















A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the 















©2020 Noah Futterman 
All Rights Reserved 





State legislatures are often forgotten or ignored when discussing politics, but their 
impact on state-level and local lawmaking as well as influencing the implementation of federal 
legislation over the last 300 or so years, has been tremendous. One of the reasons why state 
legislatures are overlooked is because of their variance in every single state in terms of size, 
what they’re called, makeup, structure, functionality, and most importantly professionalism. 
This paper examines what a state legislature is and how they vary by state, the impact of their 
professionalism on policy creation and implementation, and the different relationships at play 
between state legislatures and their corresponding executive branches, and their partners in 
federal government. Chapter 1 answers the following: How do state legislatures vary 
specifically in terms of their levels of professionalization? Although there are many elements of 
legislative professionalism, this chapter defines it as how full-time or part-time a specific 
legislative body is; meaning how much time does a lawmaker spend on the job. Chapter 2 
answers the following question: How does legislative professionalism and political makeup of 
state executive branches impact how laws and policies are implemented at the state level? 
Studying the relationship between state legislatures and their corresponding governors, this 
chapter examines case studies of federal and state laws, specifically the Affordable Care Act 
and its implementation at the state level. This case study makes clear that less professionalized 
state legislatures are at a constitutional disadvantage and are unable to provide a “check” on 
their respective executive branch. Chapter 3 answers the following: Does the full-time career 
nature of state legislatures and political makeup of state governance, each alone and taken 
together, have an impact on how federal laws are implemented at the state level? Through 
healthcare outcomes, results show that states with more active, full-time, and professionalized 
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legislatures have better outcomes and are also more prepared and more equipped to serve 
their constituencies.  The research in this paper warrants a consideration for implementing 
nationwide standards for state legislative professionalism so that states can react with certainty 
and real lawmaking authority in the face of crisis. 
 
Readers: 
 Professor Pam Prah 
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 American democracy as a form of government is unique.  It sets itself apart from the 
rest of the world, in part, because of the power the system gives to state and local 
governments.  The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States lays out the 
states’ specific powers.  This amendment asserts, “all powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States…”  
Clearly, in creating this amendment, the framers of the Constitution denoted a broad and vast 
set of powers to the states and their respective forms of governments.  American democracy is 
also distinctive because of its various layers of checks and balances.  When drafting the 
Constitution and forming the new world they had imagined, the framers knew they had to limit 
the powers vested in the federal government and in the presidency, while also limiting 
legislative predominance.1  The responsibility of this balance was left not only in the hands of 
the other two federal branches – the Legislature and the Judiciary – but also to the states.   
During the U.S. Supreme Court case of New State Ice Company v. Liebmann (1932), in 
which the New State Ice Company, which was properly licensed by the Corporation Commission 
of Oklahoma, brought suit against Liebman to prevent him from selling ice in Oklahoma City 
without a license, Justice Louis Brandeis used the phrase, “states are laboratories of 
democracy.”2  During his dissent, the justice stated the following: “Denial of the right to 
                                                     
1 "How America Is Different From Other Democracies." U.S. News & World Report. 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/10/21/how-america-is-different-from-other-
democracies. 




experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation.  It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory.”3  His decision here and the meaning behind his argument was such that states, 
and their electorate, can decide, more so have the right, to experiment with new policies and 
laws without effecting the other states in the union. 
 Later in the 20th century, Tip O'Neill, Speaker of the United States House of 
Representatives from 1977 to 1987, coined the phrase “all politics is local.”  In using this 
phrase, he meant that elected government officials, even on a national scale, need the skills of 
local politicians to win elections.4  He also meant this as a nod to the backroom political deals 
and skills often spoken about when discussing state and local politics, specifically state 
legislatures.5  Although it is unclear whether the state level experiment approach is what the 
founders of the nation were after, it is certainly clear that they sought independence from the 
federal government.  If states are indeed the laboratories of democracy, then each state’s 
legislature is the chief laboratory technician, responsible for researching, crafting, debating, and 
passing new laws, as well as serving and listening to their constituents’ everyday needs.   
Much like when a reporter at the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and other 
national level newspapers, digests an article in a local newspaper, then he or she takes it, 
follows up and reports on it, politicians and executive branch agency heads at the federal level 
often use an initiative or policy successfully carried through the state level as the source of a 
                                                     
3 Ibid 





new national law or program.  For example, in 2006 under Republican Governor Mitt Romney 
and in collaboration with the state legislature, Massachusetts established a health care reform 
law that became the model for President Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act.6  Massachusetts’ 
health reform bill is exactly what Justice Brandies had in mind when he spoke about states 
being the laboratories of democracy and being able to accomplish things, whether successful 
and positive or not, that only impact its own residents.   
State legislatures are often forgotten or ignored when discussing politics, but their 
impact on state-level and local lawmaking as well as influencing federal legislation over the last 
300 or so years, has been tremendous.  The first legislature or local body of government in the 
United States, was the Virginia House of Burgesses, which was modeled after the English 
Parliament.7  Established in 1643, it would hold a voting session around once per year to vote 
on laws and determine local taxes.8  The House of Burgesses was comprised of 22 elected 
officials representing 11 districts in Virginia.9  State legislatures have come a long way since the 
1600s and overall have become more professional.  Currently, however, their size, makeup, 
structure, functionality, and professionalism still varies across the states.  These state 
government differences are largely unknown to the general public, not because of a lack of 
transparency, but as stated before, the majority of politics revolves around the federal 
government, congress, and the presidency. 
                                                     
6 Beyond Obamacare: Lessons from Massachusetts. Anthony, Barbara. September 2017. Associate working paper 
series, Number 84, Harvard Kennedy School. 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/82_BeyondObamcare.pdf  





As noted, state legislatures vary dramatically in terms of their size, their functionality, 
and their professionalism.  An example of this striking variability is the total number of 
members per legislative body, as New Hampshire has the largest state legislature with 424 total 
members and Nebraska has the smallest with only 49.  For this paper, to measure legislative 
professionalism we will use the following definitions and groupings for states: A “part-time 
legislature,” is a body that operates less than year-round, has minimal to no support staff, and 
its elected officials are paid less than a living wage; a “full-time legislature” functions year-
round with full-time staff, and elected officials are paid a livable salary; and hybrid states that 
have legislatures that operate and function somewhere in the middle.  These characteristics can 
weigh heavily on the speed at which a legislative body operates, the quality of laws passed, as 
well as on the number of bills signed into law.   
This paper examines what a state legislature is and how they vary by state, the impact of 
their professionalism on policy creation, and the different relationships at play between state 
legislatures and their corresponding executive branches (governors) and their partners (or 
adversaries) in the federal government.  Chapter one will examine the various aspects of state 
legislative makeup by comparing different legislative bodies throughout the United States.  
Using a comparative analysis, this chapter will dive into what it really means to be a fully 
professionalized state legislature.  Chapter two examines the relationship between state 
legislatures and their corresponding executive branch.  This chapter’s analysis includes a case 
study to answer the following question: How does legislative professionalism and political 
makeup of state executive branches impact how laws and policies are implemented at the state 
level?  Finally, chapter three will explore what impact legislative professionalism has on state-
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level implementation of federal law.  This chapter also uses a case study and answers the 
following question: Does the full-time career nature of state legislatures and political makeup of 
state governance, each alone and taken together, have an impact on how federal laws and 
policies are implemented or impacted at the state level?  In both chapters two and three, the 
case studies aim to exploit policy implementation stemming from the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), including laws passed at the state level in response to the ACA, as well as Medicaid 
expansion.  Overall, this paper will make clear that professionalized legislatures are not only 
nimbler and more effective at passing laws, but also more able to hold other aspects of 
government accountable.    
  Although state legislatures have matured and operated on a more professional basis 
over time, little has been studied and written about the importance of legislative 
professionalism on policy implementation.  The major scholars that have written about this 
topic include Peverill Squire, Gary Moncrief, Morris Fiorina, and Karl Kurtz.  This group, although 
they write in great detail and lengths analyzing state legislatures, they all tend to agree that 
legislative professionalism is defined by the following combination – the number of bills 
introduced, laws passed, time for elected officials that is spent on the job, annual 
compensation, staff resources, staff salary, and rates of membership turnover.  This paper does 
not dispute their analysis, but rather uses it, collectively, to determine and exploit the impacts 
of legislative professionalism on state policy-making, legislative processes, and on an individual 
legislature’s ability to react to and implement federal law.   
During 2020, the responsibility and role of state legislatures has, arguably, never been 
so important.  As the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States, state executives and their 
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legislators attempted to counteract the dire and deadly effect of one of the worst public health 
crises in modern history.  This responsibility became even more crucial, as the federal 
government’s response to the virus became inadequate and created confusion for states, their 
leaders, and most importantly their residents.  Essentially there was no playbook for states to 
follow, and as governors across the nation signed and passed executive orders to primarily 
close nonessential businesses and schools, require people to wear masks, and to ramp up virus 
testing and tracing, state legislatures also tried to pass laws to react to aspects of daily life that 
could not be handled as easily through executive action.  These laws included expanding paid 
sick time, changes to voting and elections, healthcare eligibility, and insurance coverage.  But 
before they were able to pass these important measures, state legislatures needed to figure 
out how they would vote and pass laws remotely.  Initially 23 states instituted some form of 
remote voting, which in and of itself required a vote.10  Among the states that did not react and 
implement some form of virtual legislative sessions, were Rhode Island, Montana, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Georgia, and Texas.11  These states are also viewed as having some of 
the least professionalized state legislatures.   
When the Coronavirus first hit the United States, governors really had no choice but to 
pass executive actions.  However, as the pandemic has plagued on, executive actions have 
become weaker as their legality has been challenged in courts throughout the nation.  
Additionally, in most instances they do not carry the full weight of law and are meant to be 
                                                     






more of a temporary solution.12  Elizabeth Goitein of the New York University School of Law’s 
Brennan Center for Justice reiterated this point further: “The justification of a governor taking 
on the function of the Legislature in that context [of emergency situations] is there’s not 
enough time for the Legislature to get together and make new laws. That justification gets 
weaker and weaker the longer the state of emergency goes on.”13  As executive action has 
faded out, the full weight of new reactionary laws to the public health crisis have needed to 
fade in; this much state legislatures know.   
                                                     
12 Stout, Matt. "The Coronavirus Pandemic Highlights Baker's Sweeping - and Indefinite - Emergency Authority - 











The United States was founded and built upon the notion of checks and balances.  The 
nation’s framers set out to create a system of governance that could work and hold up in times 
of crisis, including wars, economic downturn, and civil upheaval.  When discussing politics, most 
people throughout the United States think of the presidency, as well as congress, which 
includes the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.  When speaking about how 
laws are made, most people think of the federal government and federal laws.  It is hard not to 
think otherwise, as the current media landscape primarily covers this space as well.  That being 
said, it is true that the federal government – which is made up of three branches, including the 
Executive Branch (the president), the Legislative Branch (congress), and the Judicial Branch (the 
supreme court and underlying court systems) – has vast power and lawmaking abilities.  
However, when considering how laws are made and how society is progressed forward through 
policy shifts, state legislatures must be included in the conversation, as they are a key 
component.   
Among many others, productive state legislatures have three core functions.  These 
legislative bodies must work to balance the power of both the state’s court system and its 
governor, as well as the federal government, represent its constituencies, and of course debate 
and pass laws.14  President Wilson, who was governor of New Jersey before becoming 
                                                     




president, believed states and local governments were solely responsible for developing 
policies at the local and municipal level.  He said: “It is that the Legislatures of the States shall 
have control of all the general subject-matter of law, of private rights of every kind, of local 
interests and of everything that directly concerns their people as communities…”15  Wilson 
explains here, it is the state legislatures that impact how laws are passed and implemented.  
Additionally, state legislatures are also charged with figuring out how to take what is passed 
into law at the federal level in congress and how to implement it at the state level.   
 In the media, especially in the current era of the 24-hour news cycle, where headlines 
last a matter of hours and in some cases minutes, state legislatures, and their work, often gets 
forgotten and overlooked.  But to Wilson’s point, the work they carry out is a pivotal element of 
the nation’s governmental structure and how American society functions.  Although every state 
has a legislature, these governmental bodies vary in their professionalization (full-time vs. part-
time), operations and formal voting, makeup, and composition.  Massachusetts, for instance, 
has a full-time legislature, while Montanan legislators operate formal sessions only 90 days 
every other year; then there is Hawaii which operates on a part-time basis during a two-year 
legislative session.16  On the spectrum of professionalized state legislatures, Massachusetts is 
on one end (fully professionalized), Montana on the other (least professionalized), with a state 
like Hawaii somewhere in between.  This diversity in the structure of legislatures is what this 
chapter aims to exploit; to understand how legislative professionalism impacts how laws are 
passed and how policies are implemented at the state level.  This chapter will answer the 
                                                     
15 Wilson, Woodrow. "The States and the Federal Government." The North American Review 187, no. 630 (1908): 
684-701. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25106130. 
16 “Full- and Part-Time Legislatures - Ncsl.org.” Accessed October 26, 2019.  
 
 10 
following question: How do state legislatures vary in terms of their levels of professionalization 
and how does this professionalization impact how policies are passed and implemented? 
 
Overview of State Legislatures 
 There are reasons why the work and impact of state legislatures may be less known.  
Unlike, the U.S. Congress which is centrally located in Washing D.C., the nation’s capital, with 
two distinct bodies, the House and the Senate, state legislatures vary in their names and titles, 
size, functionality, and how they’re governed (i.e. leadership structure).  Every state has some 
sort of a legislative body made up of elected representatives, whose primary responsibility is to, 
according to the White House, “consider matters brought forth by the governor or introduced 
by its members to create legislation that becomes law.”17  The other main task of state 
legislative officials is to formulate and pass the state’s budget.18  As of 2018, Republicans 
control 30 state legislatures, while Democrats maintain a majority in 19.19   
Across the country in various states, legislatures have differing names, ranging from the 
congressionally similar “house of representatives” and “senate” to “general assembly,” 
“general court,” “council,” and “legislative assembly.”20  Although the specific names can vary, 
in 27 states, the legislature is called the “legislature,” or the “state legislature,” while in 19 
states the legislature is called the general assembly.”21  Further, while 49 states are made up of 
                                                     
17 “State & Local Government.” The White House, The United States Government, www.whitehouse.gov/about-
the-white-house/state-local-government/.  
18 Ibid 
19 “With One-Party Control in Most States, Minority Parties Are 'Teetering on Irrelevance'.” In 2019, All But One 
State Legislature Is Controlled by One Party.  





bicameral legislatures – an upper body (typically the senate) and a lower body (typically the 
house) – Nebraska is the only state that operates through a unicameral legislature (one 
legislative body) which is simply called the Nebraska Legislature.22     
State legislatures also vary in size.  Currently, they range from 49 to 424 total members, 
and over time, these numbers have shifted based on state constitutional amendments and 
population changes.  Nebraska, due to only having one legislative body, is currently the smallest 
state legislature while New Hampshire is currently the largest state legislature.23  State law also 
varies as it relates to term length, as some states use two-year terms and others are on four-
year election cycles.  State legislatures were developed through their state constitutions, but 
over time, the functionality and governance structure of these bodies changed.  As populations 
have shifted in states and census data has been updated every ten years, state legislative 
bodies have had to adapt.  If a state’s population calls for additional legislative representation, 
the legislature has to react and add an additional seat, or vice versa if populations trend in a 
downwards direction.24   
 
How a State Legislature Functions  
In every state legislature bills become laws through the committee process.25  In 
general, legislative committees are tasked with researching, understanding, collecting public 
input and testimony, and then presenting bills to a full body of the state house and state senate 
                                                     
22 Ibid 
23 Warnock, Kae, and Brenda Erickson. Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, 
www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-and-length-of-terms.aspx.  
24 Ibid 
25 Makse, Todd. “The Retention of Expertise and Productivity in State Legislative Committees.” State Politics & 
Policy Quarterly 17, no. 4 (December 2017): 418–40. 
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(or state assembly).26  Bills, as well as committees, are broken down and split up by subject 
matter, such as healthcare, education, economic development, and taxation, then distributed 
to the committee best suited to determine if the topic warrants debate (and ultimately a vote) 
of the full legislative body.  Committees are responsible for rooting out weak bills, as well as re-
writing and amending legislation which can be improved upon.  In some ways, the committee 
process has been successful due to its bipartisan approach, as these small groups are made up 
of both democrats and republicans, which can result in committees formulating bipartisan 
products.27  However, some view the committee system as overtly partisan, as the majority 
party will typically have the final say in terms of what bills will progress further and possibly be 
voted into law.28  The relationship between the majority and minority parties varies by state, as 
some state legislatures grant more authority to elected officials in the minority party.29  
Partisanship or bi-partisanship at the committee level depends on what issue is being 
discussed, as in many cases, bills at the state level will be more practical and legislators will 
agree to work together for the common good.  
 For example, healthcare has been an issue where both major parties, Democrat and 
Republican, have been able to work together at the state level and pass laws to improve the 
quality of life for millions of constituents.30  Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 
2010, states have voted on and implemented the expansion of Medicaid, the federal program 
                                                     
26 Ibid 
27 “The Importance of Committees.” ushistory.org. Independence Hall Association. Accessed November 16, 2019. 
http://www.ushistory.org/gov/6c.asp. 
28 Smith, C. Lysle. "The Committee System in State Legislatures." The American Political Science Review 12, no. 4 
(1918).  
29 Ibid 




that supports lower income individuals and families.  According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, state Medicaid agencies must work with federal partners to adopt Medicaid 
expansion, thus weighing heavily on the relationship between states and the federal 
government.31  Depending on the state, its healthcare agency makeup and oversight, 
governance and legislative structures, and party affiliation (the political party in control), there 
are different guidelines for what kinds of Medicaid changes can be authorized.  States vary in 
terms of which kinds of regulatory changes must be made through amendments to state 
statute – which would require legislative approval, therefore starting at the legislative 
committee level.  In some states, policies like Medicaid expansion can also be passed by voter 
referendum (ballot initiative).  By 2015, 28 states had adopted Medicaid expansion and in the 
majority of instances, the new healthcare policies were passed and implemented through the 
legislative and committee process.32  For example, in Minnesota, the state legislature took up a 
stand-alone bill (independent from any other piece of legislation) that was referred to the 
Committee on Health and Human Services Policy.  This committee held public hearings and 
amended the bill then sent it along to the Committee on Ways and Means.  Ways and Means 
committees are responsible for all tax and budgetary issues.  In 2013, the Minnesota State 
Legislature voted on and passed Medicaid expansion in less than two months, which was quite 
fast for this state legislative body that operates on a more part-time basis.33  Alternatively, 
consider the state of New York, which included the Medicaid expansion package as part of a 
                                                     
31 Antonisse, Larisa, and Robin Rudowitz. “An Overview of State Approaches to Adopting the Medicaid Expansion - 
Issue Brief.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, February 28, 2019. https://www.kff.org/report-section/an-
overview-of-state-approaches-to-adopting-the-medicaid-expansion-issue-brief/ 





budget bill passed during the 2013 legislative session.  This process did not include any 
healthcare specific committees and was taken up by the Financial Services Committee and then 
passed along to ways and means.34  Depending on the state, their level of legislative 
professionalism, and where they are in the legislative cycle, the legislative process, or 
committee process, will vary. 
 
State Legislative Budget Process 
The annual budget is thought of by political experts, as the most important aspect of 
state governance and state decision-making.  A state’s budget touches all aspects of residential 
life and can really be the difference in moving a state forward in the right direction or 
backwards in the wrong direction.  During this process, generally, the governor sends his or her 
version of the budget to the legislature for debate, first in the House of Representatives (or 
state assembly, depending on the state), and then in the state senate.  States operate on either 
an annual budget cycle every fiscal year, which typically begins on July 1, or they function using 
a biennial budget cycle (one budget which spans and covers two fiscal years).35  Right now, 
there are twenty states that enact biennial budgets.36  Additionally, with the exception of 
Vermont, states are required to balance their budgets; this is dissimilar to the federal 
government that does not have to balance its budget.37  Figure 1 below, details the entire 
                                                     
34 Ibid 







process from start to finish for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which enacts a budget for 
every fiscal year.     
Figure 1 – Budget Process for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Source: https://malegislature.gov/  
 
As shown in Figure 1, once the fiscal year budget has passed both the state House and Senate, 
the governor may choose to veto or sign the bill.  In some states, including Massachusetts, the 
governor has line-item veto authority, where he or she has the option not only to veto the 
entire bill, but also just certain sections (line items) they might disagree with (veto rules vary by 
state).   
 
Professionalized vs. Non-professionalized Legislatures and an Overview of Legislative 
Governance 
 
 It is clear from the three legislative examples used above (Massachusetts, Montana, and 
Hawaii) that states vary greatly in terms of how their legislatures are structured and how they 
operate.  As defined and laid out in the introduction, a “part-time legislature,” is a body that 
operates less than year-round, has minimal to no support staff, and its elected officials are paid 
less than a living wage.  On the other hand, a “full-time legislature” functions year-round with 
full-time staff, and elected officials are paid a livable salary.38  There are also states that have 
                                                     




legislatures that are considered “hybrids.”  This generally means the legislature’s lawmakers 
spend about two-thirds of a full-time job in their roles as elected officials and earn less money 
than their colleagues in states with full-time legislatures.  From a legislative professionalism 
standpoint, the ideal state legislature should function more like congress, with individual 
legislative offices setup with full-time elected officials and then specific staff devoted to 
researching public policy, providing political communications, and constituent services.  
Public policy theorists and experts alike have examined the notion of professionalized 
state legislatures for years.39  Some past studies do indicate that full-time legislatures are more 
responsive to constituents than part-time legislatures and are therefore more apt to effectively 
implement laws handed down by the federal government, especially those that are more suited 
to their constituents needs.40  Further, more professionalized legislatures have been found to 
have more of an impact on partisan policy debates, as well as policy outcomes in general.41  
However, the argument over what type of legislature works better is not that simple, as some 
in the field of public policy and government view full-time legislatures as sometimes getting in 
the way of governors and state executive branches and their policy priorities.42  Others have 
also revealed that part-time legislatures are more efficient in enacting laws because of their 
more condensed window of operation; these views argue part-time state governmental bodies 
                                                     
39 Maestas, Cherie. "Professional Legislatures and Ambitious Politicians: Policy Responsiveness of State 
Institutions." Legislative Studies Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2000): 663-90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/440439. 
40 Ibid 
41 Woods, Neal D., and Michael Baranowski. "Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies: The 
Effects of Resources and Careerism." Legislative Studies Quarterly 31, no. 4 (2006): 585-609. 
www.jstor.org/stable/40263404. 





have less time to debate “strange bills” and as a result only focus on enacting and implementing 
potential bills that will have the most impact on constituents.43  Additionally, more 
professionalized legislatures can lead to elected officials becoming “career politicians” which 
can result in these individuals focusing primarily on only getting reelected and fundraising. 
 
History of Legislative Professionalism 
Government analysts explain that up until the mid-twentieth century, state legislatures 
did not vary all that much and most states operated legislative bodies that were part-time and 
not professionalized.44  However, in response to the Great Depression, which lasted from 1929 
to 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt launched the New Deal to spur economic relief 
through governmental and industry reforms.45  After this vast policy was implemented, the 
federal government’s role in American life expanded dramatically, forever shifting the role of 
state legislatures.46   
The New Deal expanded the federal executive branch in a way the United States had 
never seen before.  The policy created new government agencies whose responsibility was to 
create economic development throughout the nation at the state level.  The transition left an 
impact on state and local governments, as increasing demands on states came, as Congress 
pushed money into their legislatures through grants, stimulus projects and new federally 
mandated programs.47  It was for this reason that state legislatures needed to adapt and 
                                                     
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid 
45 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. “New Deal.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 3 
Dec. 2019, www.britannica.com/event/New-Deal.  




become more able to implement vast federal programs, policies, community and business-
oriented grants, and other stimulus initiatives.48  Although the New Deal pushed legislatures to 
become more full-time, hold greater responsibilities and be more accountable to their 
constituencies, by the end of the 1950s, legislatures were still relatively understaffed and, on 
average, only voted formally a few months out of the year.     
Advocates for state government reforms in the 1960s and into the 1970s fought for 
legislative changes throughout the United States.49  Thought leaders, lobbyists, and elected 
officials in different states worked to bring more diverse and more highly-educated candidates 
into the realm of state government.50  The goal in the short-term was to create more career-
oriented state legislatures and in the long-term build up and enhance state legislatures to the 
point where these bodies are more independent and hold as much power as executive 
branches and agencies at the state level.51  Post 1980, a group of states started buying into the 
notion of a more full-time legislature with the idea that a state’s legislature should function 
more similarly to congress, in terms of professionalization.  Legislatures in California, Illinois, 
New York, and Pennsylvania reformed their legislatures, began meeting and holding formal 
session on a more year-round basis, instead of for only a few months, and also started bringing 
on support staff.52  These states also enhanced legislative pay and salaries for the elected 
                                                     
48 Ibid 
49 Woods, Neal D., and Michael Baranowski "Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies: The 








officials and their staff.  Smaller states rejected these reforms and remained part-time with no 
support staff and maintained paying non-livable wages for elected officials.53  
 
Comparative Analysis: State Legislative Professionalism 
 As was laid out in the research above, every state legislature varies in terms of its 
professionalization (full-time vs. part-time), operations, makeup, and functionality.  Using 
definitions previously stated, a “non-professionalized legislature” (part-time) is a body that 
operates less than year-round, has minimal to no support staff, and its elected officials are paid 
less than an average living wage.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, a “professionalized 
legislature” (full-time) operates on a more year-round basis with full-time staff members, 
paying elected officials an above-average livable wage.  Then there are hybrid state legislatures 
that operate somewhere in the middle.  As stated earlier, full-time legislatures are more 
responsive to constituents than part-time legislatures and are therefore more apt to effectively 
work with and respond to their corresponding executive branch, and may be able to pass more 
laws.54  To illustrate this point further, more professionalized and full-time legislatures over the 
years have been found to have more of an impact on partisan politics and policy outcomes in 
general.55   
Figure 2 – Legislative professionalism broken down by state 
Full-time Hybrid Part-time 
California Alabama Minnesota Idaho 
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Ohio Arizona Missouri Kansas 
Wisconsin Arkansas Nebraska Maine 
New York Colorado Nevada Mississippi 
Pennsylvania Connecticut New Jersey New Hampshire 
Alaska Delaware North Carolina New Mexico 
Hawaii Florida Oklahoma Rhode Island 
Illinois Georgia Oregon Utah 
Massachusetts Indiana South Carolina Vermont 
 Iowa Tennessee West Virginia 
 Kentucky Texas Montana 
 Louisiana Virginia North Dakota 
 Maryland Washington South Dakota 
     Wyoming 
 
Taking data compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures, combined with 
independent analysis of state legislative functionality and operations (legislative pay, time 
spent on the job, and staff resources), Figure 2 shows, in general, the state breakdown in terms 
of legislative professionalization.  Although some studies have shown some differing results, in 
terms of legislative professionalism, this table makes it clear that most states operate with 
either a part-time or hybrid state legislature.   
Differing state legislative structures have shown that full-time state governing bodies 
are able to spend more time on the job.  To achieve a more substantial picture, reviewing 
legislative professionalism more broadly is critical.  Research shows that some of the most 
professionalized state legislatures are those of California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New 
York (alphabetical order).56  These states pay legislators significantly more than other states, 
provide resources so each legislator can have staff, and each meets in full-time legislative 
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voting sessions.57  Three out of these top four professionalized legislatures are in states that as 
a whole (i.e. the voters) consistently vote for Democrats across the board in the majority of 
both federal and state elections (including presidential).58  Conversely, the states that have long 
ranked at the bottom of the legislative professionalism list, including New Hampshire, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, tend to have Republican majorities, pay their 
elected officials less, and provide less staff to each legislative office.59   
 Research reveals that scholars have differing views on what makes a state legislature 
more or less professionalized.  Overall, most concur that it is a combination of bills introduced, 
laws passed, time for elected officials that is spent on the job, annual compensation, staff 
resources, staff salary, and rates of membership turnover.  For the purpose of this analysis, the 
most important categories to compare will be elected official compensation, average number 
of staff per elected, and average time spent on the job for each legislator.   
Figure 3 – Spectrum of legislative professionalization broken down by compensation, time on 
job, and staff resources 
 
Category of Professionalization Full-time Legislature Part-time Legislature 
Compensation Higher annual salary for 
legislator 
Lower annual salary for 
legislator 
  
Those in leadership 
positions are paid more 
No compensation incentives 
for leadership 
  Less turnover More turnover 
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Time on Job Legislators spend close to 
100% of work week 
working as an elected 
representative 
Legislators spend close to 
50% of work week working 
as an elected representative 
  Do not have a second job Have a second job 
Staff Resources Legislators have their 
own staff 
Legislators do not have staff 
  Staff salaries are higher Staff salaries are lower 
 
Various analyses of state legislative structures have shown that full-time state governing 
bodies are able to spend more time on the job.  




As shown in Figure 4, one study examined the categories of “time on the job” and 
compensation and found that full-time legislative officials, on average, spend 80 percent of 
normal works hours (9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) actually working and on average make $68,599.60  On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, the study revealed part-time state legislative elected officials 
                                                     




only work 54 percent of the regular work week and are compensated $15,984, on average.61  
Alaska, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Wisconsin have legislative bodies setup so members 
spend roughly 80 percent of the work week (9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday) working 
on state business.  The remainder of the states, spend less than two thirds of regular working 
hours on matters of state business and legislation, and the legislatures in the states of Arkansas, 
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon and Texas hold voting sessions every other year, 
only.62 
As noted in Figure 3, more full-time state legislatures pay their elected representatives 
more, California sits atop the list, paying out at least $99,000 annually to each legislator.63  In 
California, as well as in other states, including Massachusetts, elected officials in the legislature 
are incentivized based on elevated leadership status.  New Hampshire, which was noted earlier 
to have the largest state legislature but operates on a part-time basis, pays its elected officials 
only a small compensatory salary of just over $100 per year.64  For staffing, full-time legislatures 
typically have more staff in each representative, senator, or assembly-person’s office; on 
average, full-time legislators have 8.9 staff members and part-time legislators employ 1.2 
staffers.65  This overview makes it clear state legislative compensation and staff support can 
vary dramatically.  
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State legislatures exist as being a check and a balance on the varying levels of state 
governments, as well as the federal government.  Their variance in elected official “time spent 
on the job,” salaries for both legislators and their staff, as well as leadership incentives, can 
certainly influence how many bills are filed and passed each legislative session.  Lawmaker’s 
time on the job, however, has the clearest effect on how impactful each law passed can actually 
be.  This attention to detail can really only be achieved with more time spent drafting, 
researching, and writing influential laws by both elected officials and their staff.  
This state legislative power can be far reaching, as state legislatures can institute their 
own rules, their own bills, their own policy agendas which can completely counteract the 
federal government (this type of balance will be outlined and detailed in the following 
chapters).  Full-time legislatures clearly hold governors and their administrations accountable, 
but they also can assist in helping a gubernatorial administration’s agenda become reality.66  
This is primarily because, as outlined in the comparative analysis section above, more 
professionalized legislatures spend more time on the job and therefore can pass more bills, 
including those filled and written by state-level executive branches.  However, two questions 
still remain to be answered: How far reaching is state legislative power as it relates to the 
federal government and laws passed that impact the states?  And, how much of a check can a 
state legislature be on its corresponding executive branch?  Through various case studies, the 
next two chapters will provide insights to these important questions and will clearly show that 
                                                     





more professionalized state legislatures are more suited and prepared to take on these 





The Impact of Legislative Professionalism on State-level Policy-making 
 
Introduction 
The paths of policy implementation can vary dramatically in each of the 50 states.  
When implementing a new law, every state has differing governmental variables, including 
political relationships, legislative professionalism and structural makeup, as well as executive 
branch functionality (i.e. how large the executive branch is).  As chapter one showed, the 
relationship between state legislatures and the federal government, and legislative 
professionalism and political parties play as large a role as any when seeking to understand how 
laws are implemented.  This chapter focuses on a critical political relationship when examining 
how laws are implemented: state legislatures and their corresponding executive branches (i.e. 
governors and their administrations).   
Through the lens of the relationship between state legislatures and executive branches, 
this chapter examines case studies of federal and state laws, specifically the Affordable Care Act 
and its implementation at the state level.  Examining these relationships helps evaluate what 
type of legislature might produce the best results for its constituents.  This chapter uses a series 
of concepts to guide this inquiry.  They are: The relationship between state legislatures and 
corresponding executive branches (i.e. the governor); the evolution of supermajorities and their 
impact on policy making; and how the partisanship divides at the state level (divided 
governments) impacts policy creation and implementation.  Using case studies, this paper 
examines the evolution of divided governments and legislative professionalism to answer the 
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following question: How does legislative professionalism and political makeup of state executive 
branches impact how laws and policies are implemented at the state level?   
 
Divided Governments 
Political theorists have considered the increase in divided government trend in the 
states as going from 1960 to 1990.67  During this time, more so in the southern states, where 
some state legislative bodies were becoming more full-time, many entrenched Republican 
incumbent governors were defeating Democratic challengers.  This resulted in furthering 
divided government across the board in the south, electing more Democrats to legislative seats, 
while maintaining Republican governorships.68  It is important to note that during the early 
1960s, advocacy for civil rights and voting rights was at an all-time high, which could have had 
an outsized effect on more Democrats being elected to legislative seats (both the Civil Rights 
Act and Voting Rights Act were passed in 1965).69  
Many studies have declared that from a historical perspective, political polarization in 
the United States is currently high and rising.70  At various times in American history, 
polarization has been identified as an issue, more than just political, but cultural.  These 
polarized political-cultural divides have helped lead to more divided governments.71  Since 
World War II, divided governments—when control of the executive branch and the legislative 
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branch is split between two parties—have become increasingly more common.72  Why divided 
governments have become more common, however, is less clear.  Some studies have found 
that Democrats and Republicans might be better at running for different types of offices, which 
as a result have led to diverging functionality and operations at different levels of 
government.73  For example, electorally, and although this is not as true now, Democrats have 
been observed as stronger in the majority in a legislature, but have not been able to 
consistently put together presidential coalitions.  While Republican Party candidates, are 
viewed to be stronger as executives rather than the majority in the House or Senate.74  Divided 
governments seem to also be a product of state legislative professionalism.  As noted above, 
Democrats have been more successful at winning legislative seats and history has shown that 
more professionalized legislatures are more attractive to Democratic candidates and voters.75  
Policy-wise, which is what this paper examines, Democrats and Republicans can differ greatly in 
terms of how they operate while in power.  Traditionally, Democratic governors and state 
legislators will come into power and try to expand government operations and staff, as well as 
spending.76   
Republican governors and elected legislative officials, on the other hand, have typically 
sought to decrease government spending.77  When two parties collide at the state level, 
meaning when a state has a divided government (Democratic governor and Republican-led 
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state legislature, or vice versa), common sense says that production goes down, however this is 
really not the case.  Studies have revealed that a divided government between the executive 
and legislative yields no decrease in policy production (i.e. laws passed).78  This certainly has to 
be measured and observed on a case by case basis. 
 
Relationship between Divided Governments and Legislative Professionalism 
 Political scientists have long made the connection between divided governments and 
the professionalism of state legislatures.  Some have observed that more professionalized 
legislatures require more time from elected officials, where less professionalized legislatures 
allow for the representative to also have an additional, more full-time job.79  More part-time 
state legislatures allow for elected officials to also work in the private sector or own a small 
business practice; these individuals and areas of industry tend to be more republican-leaning.80  
When examining legislative professionalism, researchers have also studied the rate of salary.  
Studies have shown that for every $10,000 increase in state legislative salary compensation 
there is an increase in Democrats winning legislative seats at a rate of nearly one percent.81   
This outcome is somewhat related to the size and scale of state governments.  States 
with larger populations seem to require larger state governments and therefore a more 
significant state legislative presence in terms of time spent on the job and implementing new 
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policies.82  While size of government might be directly related to population, others suggest 
that different variables are also at play.  The primarily identified variable is state political 
ideology.  For example, Massachusetts (population 6.9 million) and Texas (population 28.7 
million), have approximately the same number of seats in their lower legislative chambers 
(house of representatives).83  Massachusetts has 200 and Texas has 181.84  Here, political 
ideology is significant, as Massachusetts as a state has voted for a Democrat in each of the last 
nine presidential elections and Texas has voted for a Republican in the last ten elections.85  This 
example shows, a significantly smaller state can have a larger state legislature, compared to a 
state with a much more significant population; it also makes clear that state political party has a 
direct impact on state legislative professionalism.86 
 
Relationship Behavior: State Executive vs. State Legislative  
In every state, the relationship between the state legislature and the governor and his 
or her executive branch is fluid and varies dramatically in terms of how they interact and how 
they operate together.  State legislators have long been known as the representatives of the 
people, who are in charge of writing, amending, adopting, and passing laws.87  But, the 
executive branch does get its say in crafting the state’s fiscal year budget, so there is a balance.  
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For example, in Massachusetts, each year the governor releases an initial annual budget at the 
end of January, well before the legislature has any say or input.  As a result, the governor gets 
to set the tone and the direction for all budgetary policies for the next fiscal year.  This is the 
process taken by almost all state governments throughout the United States.88   
The other important check and balance between a legislature and a governor, is the role 
of the veto and the type of power it can (which can vary by state).  A governor’s veto power 
depends solely on their relationship between them and the legislature and what type of 
majority is in legislative power.89  Further, a state legislature can essentially erase a governor’s 
veto power when a majority of one political party is in legislature power; this is referred to as a 
veto-proof majority or supermajority.90   Although the voting threshold varies by state, 
supermajorities are most important when the opposite party from the legislature controls the 
governorship; this creates more opportunities for legislative supermajorities to override 
gubernatorial vetoes.  For example, legislatures in Massachusetts and Maryland have 
Democratic Party legislative supermajorities (defined as a two-thirds majority of one political 
party in both chambers) and Republican governors; North Carolina is the opposite with 
Republican legislative supermajorities and a Democratic governor.  This leaves those executive 
administrations with limited lawmaking power, especially during fiscal budget debate and 
significant pieces of legislation.91     
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Supermajorities also have a direct impact on policy-making and on the relationship 
between the legislature and the executive branch.  In general, state legislatures and their 
corresponding governors operate under the following pretenses: “Interaction between 
governors and legislatures is filled with nuances, but the relationships can be summarized into 
three broad configurations: the governor is dominant, the legislature is dominant, and the two 
are competitively structured.”92  These two governmental entities are surely competitive with 
one another, but when supermajorities are a variable, the relationship can become strained.      
 
Case Study: Healthcare Policy Implementation at the State Level 
Methodology 
This chapter will use a case study to examine health care policy implementation in 
various states.  It will consider the following variables: State legislative professionalism, and the 
relationship between the state legislature and its corresponding executive branch.  The purpose 
will be to determine what effects they had on healthcare policy implementation.  This case 
study will help answer the question at hand, which is: How does legislative professionalism and 
political makeup of state executive branches impact how laws and policies are implemented at 
the state level? 
The path towards policy implementation gets complex when different governmental 
relationships are considered.  Through the lens of healthcare policy, most specifically during the 
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immediate years after the Affordable Care Act was passed (2010), this case study focuses on 
four scenarios:  
 a Democratic legislative supermajority and a Democratic governor 
(Massachusetts in the Deval Patrick administration);  
 a Democratic legislative supermajority and a Republican governor (New Jersey in 
the Chris Christie administration);  
 a Republican supermajority and a Democratic governor (North Carolina during 
the Bev Purdue administration); and  
 a Republican legislative supermajority and a Republican governor (Texas, during 
the Rick Perry administration).   
 
Introduction 
Healthcare is a national policy issue.  In some states, however, legislatures and 
governors have been able to (or forced to) work together to pass legislation to improve the 
quality of medical care for residents.93  Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—
known as Obamacare—in 2010, states have since voted on and implemented different 
healthcare packages, including the expansion of Medicaid which is the federal program that 
supports lower income individuals and families.  At the state level, Medicaid agencies must 
work with federal partners to adopt Medicaid expansions and other federal health policy 
guidelines, which weighs heavily on the relationship between states and the federal 
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government.94  Considering the variables, professionalization of state legislatures (full-time vs. 
part-time) and the relationship between state legislatures and their corresponding executive 
branch, this case study examines the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid expansion, and how 
these vast policies were implemented at the state level from 2010 forward.  
 
 
Massachusetts: D-Legislature, D-Governor 
The Massachusetts State Legislature is a full-time, fully professionalized legislative body 
that meets year-round and is controlled by the Democratic Party in both its House of 
Representatives and State Senate.95  In 2010, at the time of the passage of the ACA, 
Massachusetts had what is referred to by political experts as a trifecta, which means the 
legislature (House and Senate) as well as the governor’s office were controlled by the same 
party (Democrat).96  In 2006, Massachusetts established an ACA-type comprehensive 
healthcare reform package which provided healthcare coverage to all residents, essentially only 
if they wanted it.  After expanding healthcare coverage to 98% of residents, Massachusetts saw 
healthcare costs balloon to over 50 percent of the state’s annual budget.97   
In 2011 and 2012, under the Patrick administration, Massachusetts legislative leaders, 
while working to implement the ACA, were also hyper-focused on healthcare cost control 
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mechanisms.98  Massachusetts was unique in this regard because they already had the 
infrastructure in place to implement the ACA.  The primary task at hand—in addition to 
implementing ACA mandates—state legislative leaders believed an independent agency, not 
fiscally dependent and under the control of the Executive Branch, had to be established to 
effectively oversee healthcare policy and the ACA throughout the state.99   
Governor Patrick at first was not convinced this was the right path forward, as he 
wanted his administration to be able to maintain control of healthcare cost mechanisms and 
policies.100  Through a year’s worth of debate, deliberation, collaboration, and negotiation with 
the state’s full-time legislature, in 2012, the state passed Chapter 224.  According to the Blue 
Cross Blue Shield Foundation, the measure is summarized as: “The creation of new 
commissions and agencies to monitor and enforce the benchmark for health care cost growth, 
placing new scrutiny on health care market power, price variation, and cost growth at individual 
health care entities.”101  Among the many important elements of Chapter 224, its most 
impactful were the creations of the Health Policy Commission (HPC) and the Center for Health 
Information and Analysis (CHIA).  The HPC was responsible for establishing the annual cost 
growth benchmarks and tracking progress towards enforcing the benchmark, and CHIA’s 
responsibilities include measuring the annual change in the state’s total health care costs.102   
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Although experts have deemed it too early to tell whether Chapter 224 has been 
successful, some have declared it to be on the right path to meeting its mission of helping to 
implement the ACA, expanding oversight of healthcare policy, and eventually lowering costs.103  
That being said, health expenditures in Massachusetts are among the highest in the United 
States and spending on medical care grew more than 4 percent annually in 2015 and 2014.  This 
surpassed Chapter 224’s initial goal of keeping increases to 3.6 percent.104  Healthcare costs 
have continued to fluctuate, but according to a survey from CHIA, over 65 percent of 
Massachusetts businesses now offer health insurance coverage, which is up over nine percent 
over the national average.105 
 
New Jersey: D-Legislature, R-Governor 
 Similar to Massachusetts, the New Jersey state legislature, which is comprised of the 
State Senate and General Assembly, is a full-time and professionalized legislative body.106  The 
legislature, in 2003, passed what was called the “Basic & Essential Plan,” which offered some 
healthcare benefits at more affordable individual out-of-pocket costs.107  This plan was largely 
successful, but it did nothing for businesses and lower-income residents and families.108  New 
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Jersey was in need of a revamped healthcare system but it’s Democratic-led legislature could 
not get much accomplished with a divided government, as republican Chris Christie was 
governor.   
In 2010, when the ACA was passed, Christie had, in campaign and official statements, 
voiced his opposition to a federalized form of healthcare, primarily because New Jersey already 
had in place one of the most expansive state healthcare programs.109  In fact, Under ACA 
expansion, New Jersey was set to only expand eligibility coverage by 3.7 percent, which was 
among the lowest in the United States.110  However, in 2011, Christie’s administration, at the 
request and past advocacy from the state legislature, applied for waivers to accept federal 
Medicaid matching funds to expand coverage for lower income adults who were previously 
covered by the state.111  This was a new feature for states through the new ACA early adult 
expansion option.   
Although this was the start of New Jersey’s ACA rollout, Christie’s administration filed a 
report with the state Legislature stating that the governor decided to have the state’s health 
insurance marketplace run through the federal government’s online portal Healthcare.gov, but 
the state’s banking and insurance department was still responsible for oversight of ACA 
implementation.112  In fiscal year 2014, the Department of Banking and Insurance was awarded 
$7.6 million from the federal government to continue implementation of the ACA, along with 
Medicaid expansion, but according to legislative reports these funds were delayed and hardly 
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allocated at the state level.113  This tactic by Governor Christie allowed his administration to 
implement the ACA’s state-level mandates, while also enabling his administration to have 
complete control over the law in the state without interference from the legislature. 
 
North Carolina: R-Legislature, D-Governor 
 Like New Jersey, the state of North Carolina had a divided government in 2010 
consisting of a Republican-led legislature and at the time, a Democratic governor in Bev 
Purdue.114  North Carolina’s state legislature is considered part-time, meeting formally for only 
two-thirds of the year with elected officials making non-livable annual salaries.115  When the 
ACA was passed into law by the federal government, the relationship status between Governor 
Purdue and the legislature was not in good-standing.  In 2011, the state legislature established 
working groups consisting of elected officials, healthcare experts, providers, and consumers, to 
study and report on the impacts of the ACA on North Carolina residents.116  The groups released 
their report that detailed somewhat positive results if the state were to fully implement the 
ACA.  Following up on this report, Governor Purdue began preparations to establish an 
insurance exchange, under new ACA rules and guidelines.  However, republicans controlled 
both chambers of the legislature and, subsequently, did not let Purdue’s ACA implementation 
initiative pass.117   
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North Carolina’s divided government clearly weighed heavily on the state’s decision not 
to implement the ACA.  Purdue’s legislative push only resulted in a “bill of legislative intent” – 
essentially stating the Republican legislature would study the issue of ACA implementation 
further, but not pass it into law at the current time.118  Not participating in the ACA and 
enacting Medicaid expansion had significant impact.  Some estimate nearly 300,000 uninsured 
North Carolinians with annual incomes below the federal poverty level were ineligible for 
Medicaid because the state rejected the federal health insurance program.119   
 
Texas: R-Legislature, R-Governor 
 In 2011 and 2012, the Texas Legislature was comprised of a fully Republican-led majority 
in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.120   The Republican Party held a 
supermajority trifecta in the state, as Governor Rick Perry (R) controlled the executive branch 
and the party had a veto-proof majority in both legislative chambers.121  Similar to 
Massachusetts – but on the other end of the political spectrum – this meant whatever Texas’ 
Republican party wanted in terms of policy implementation, they easily got.  Further, in the 
case of Texas, Governor Perry had even more leverage than a typical governor because the 
state’s legislature was part time and only met formally for less than two-thirds of the year.122   
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 Leading up to the passage of the ACA, Governor Perry had been one of the more 
staunch advocates against federalized health care.123  In July of 2012, when many states across 
the nation were working to implement aspects of the ACA, as well as Medicaid expansion, Perry 
relayed to President Obama’s administration that he would not implement key provisions of 
the healthcare reform law.124  Perry did not think that a state exchange or an expansion of 
Medicaid would result in enhanced patient care and lower health insurance costs.   
 In 2012, Governor Perry officially announced the state would not implement a state-
based insurance exchange program, under new rules of the ACA.  When this announcement 
was made, Perry’s administration said it would work for “alternative solutions,” including block 
grants with fewer spending restrictions for the state.  It’s relevant to note here that at the time, 
Texas was the state with the highest amount of people without health insurance and that a 
Medicaid expansion program would have covered more than 1 million additional lower-income 
individuals.125  Specifically, of the 20 states that opted not to expand their Medicaid programs 
under the ACA, Texas had the highest percentage of adults that fell into the insurance gap 
(25%), meaning they made just over the eligibility income requirement to qualify for subsidized 
health insurance and care.126 
 
Analysis 
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 It is clear from this analysis that states took varied approaches to implementing or not 
implementing the ACA, after it was passed in 2010.  What is also clear, is that these state level 
decisions and implementation tactics were guided by the professionalism level of their state 
legislature and the legislative-executive branch relationship.  The case study revealed that much 
of the ACA state-level decision making, or at least the direction the state would attempt to 
take, was done by each state’s executive branch and governor.  In all four cases of 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Texas, the governors either made the 
unilateral decision to pass or not pass ACA rules and guidelines into state law, and therefore 
work either in collaboration or against their respective legislative bodies.   
The case study found these executive branch decisions to either file ACA legislation 
within their corresponding legislature, went one of two different ways; the governor filed 
legislation and it passed, or he/she filed legislation that went on to fail.  Massachusetts’ 
Governor Patrick (D) passed Chapter 224, which formed ACA state-level oversight and cost 
control agencies, after a year’s worth of collaboration and fruitful debate with the state’s full-
time legislature.  In North Carolina, Governor Purdue (D) took similar steps to her 
Massachusetts counterpart, that eventually went on to not pass in the state’s Republican-led, 
part-time legislature.  At the request of state legislators, New Jersey Governor Christie did end 
up applying for federal waivers under the ACA, but took full control of implementation because 
of a lack of trust and poor working relationship between his administration and the Democratic-
led, full-time state legislature.  Texas is exempted because Governor Perry, as was revealed 
above in the case study, decided to completely opt out of the ACA, so no legislative action was 
necessary.   
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 As noted, Texas was the state that had the highest number of uninsured individuals 
throughout the entire nation, but this sentiment did not matter, as the state’s part-time 
legislature failed to act for its constituents by allowing Governor Perry to completely and 
unilaterally opt out of the ACA.  It’s clear partisan politics and polarization were certainly strong 
factors of what decisions were made and what healthcare laws were passed back in 2011, 2012, 
2013, and 2014.  However, it’s also clear that less professionalized state legislatures are at a 
constitutional disadvantage and are unable to provide a “check” on their respective executive 




Chapter 3:  




In every level of politics in the United States, from a local school committee board to 
Congress, political partisanship seems to be on the rise.  Polarization is more than just a 
disagreement between politicians, citizens, and the voters.  It is about how policies that impact 
daily living and the greater good are passed and implemented.  Polarization has clearly 
impacted how laws are made and enacted at both the federal and the state level in America.127  
The polarization of American politics has certainly impacted our elected officials, but it clearly 
stems from American citizens.128  Americans have become more polarized at a local level; a poll 
from March 2020 found 71 percent of Democrats and Republicans view politics are what 
divides the American people most.129  As a result of these community-based political divides, 
outcomes at the ballot box have become more polarized, and this has had a direct impact on 
policy implementation at the state level, specifically state legislatures.130  
From health care to job creation and economic development, every issue seems to be 
more and more politicized by both the Democratic and Republican parties.   
Figure 5 – Partisanship in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
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 Source: Pewresearch.org  
Figure 5 shows the stark difference and growth in partisanship in 1994 compared to 
2017, as the left side of the political spectrum and the right side have grown further apart over 
the past two decades.  This figure also shows residents were much closer aligned back in 1994 
than they are now.  Currently, and really since President Barack Obama and now through 
President Donald Trump’s first three years, Political gridlock in Washington D.C. is clearly 
evident and real.131  As America and the rest of the world live through the worst pandemic in 
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modern history, partisanship remains evident on Capitol Hill.132  Throughout the spring of 2020, 
the nation has watched as the gridlocked congress struggles to even agree on the most basic of 
care and support – economic stimulus packages to provide support to the millions of residents 
trying to survive and put food on the table for their families during a pandemic.   
Political gridlock, confusion, and a lack of leadership from the White House and the 
entire Executive Branch during the COVID-19 pandemic, a time of desperate need, has made 
the responsibility of the states even that much greater.  Essentially, as referenced in this 
paper’s introduction chapter, during the health crisis, there has been no playbook for state 
legislatures and their leadership to follow to provide support to constituents.  When the 
pandemic first hit the United States and states were forced to close down non-essential 
businesses, the first step of state legislatures was to figure out how to vote and function, while 
being in lockdown.  Initially 23 states instituted some form of remote voting.  Among the states 
that did not react and implement some form of virtual legislative sessions, were Rhode Island, 
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Georgia, and Texas.  These states are viewed as having 
some of the least professionalized (most part-time) state legislatures in the nation.   
As was shown in chapters one and two, legislative professionalism can vary dramatically 
by state.  The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School, a non-partisan law 
and public policy institute, provides five areas of focus that can help determine a state 
legislature’s policy impact and professionalization, or as referred to in this paper as full-time 
and part-time legislatures.  The categories are representativeness, deliberativeness, 




accessibility, accountability, and efficiency.133  The Center’s study goes on to explain that 
specific criteria for professionalization can revolve around a legislature’s ability to introduce 
and enact bills, restrict debate time, and control staffing levels for specific legislative 
committees (i.e. provide specific staff expertise for each committee).134  These areas of focus 
for professionalization are different in each state legislature and the rules that govern these 
legislative bodies can range broadly as well.  
These two variables – full-time versus part-time – for state legislatures create different 
paths and outcomes for how federal actions and laws will be implemented at the state level.  
On top of that, the U.S. operates under a two-party system and states vary in terms of which 
way they lean politically – Democratic versus Republican.  This chapter aims to answer the 
following question: Does the full-time career nature of state legislatures and political makeup of 
state governance, each alone and taken together, have an impact on how federal laws and 
policies are implemented or impacted at the state level?  This question is unique and stands out 
in the conversation about how states implement federal laws because, unlike past research, it 
takes into account both variables of legislative professionalization, as well as partisanship; the 
study will both compare and contrast these pivotal aspects of governing.  Drawing on case 
studies examining implementation of federal law at the state level including the Affordable 
Care Act (passed in 2010) and the expansion of Medicaid (part of the ACA, post 2010), this 
section explores whether a full-time or part-time legislature creates different paths for how 
                                                     





federal laws are executed.  Through the examination of healthcare outcomes, results will 
indicate states with full-time legislatures implement and execute federal laws more effectively.   
 
Partisan Political Impact on State vs. Federal Policy-making 
This study, like the previous one, not only takes into account the effect of partisanship 
on federal policies, but really examines state legislative operations (including legislative 
committee processes) along with the impact of full-time and part-time state legislatures on 
policy implementation from start to finish.  In 2010, after the ACA was passed into law, 
Republican leaders in twenty-seven states sued the Obama Administration claiming that the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was unconstitutional.135  This is one example of 
state government partisanship protecting their own state interests against federal law.  Often 
times, Republican-majority states challenge the federal government when it is controlled by the 
Democratic Party or when a more liberal-leaning law is passed, and vice versa for democrats.  
Legal scholars take this notion further and explain that party politics enables state and federal 
actors to position themselves either on the side of the federal government (more liberal-
leaning states) or on the side of the states (more conservative-leaning states).136  As noted 
earlier, the nation’s framers built the United States’ governance structure around the 
relationship between the states and federal government to create a system of checks and 
                                                     






balances.  Although, at the time the constitution was being drafted, the partisan divide was not 
as vast as it has been for the past decade and still currently is now.   
Similar to the previous chapter and the above example regarding the ACA and 
Republican-leaning states suing the Obama Administration, states whose executive and 
legislative branches are controlled by the same party, will often challenge a federal law through 
the courts.137  They will not only openly and proactively disagree with the federal law, but in 
many instances states have implemented the federal law in question in ways unintended by 
Congress and the federal Executive Branch.138  In much of a sense, states can use their own 
lawmaking ability to purposefully oppose the federal government.  This concept has been 
referred to as partisan federalism and can vary dramatically depending on how far left or right 
leaning a state is.139 
Currently, Republicans control 30 state legislatures, while Democrats maintain a 
majority in 19.140  In nearly three quarters of states, the same political party controls both the 
state legislature and the executive branch, and Minnesota is currently the only state that has a 
split state legislature, meaning one body is controlled by the Democrats and the other is 
controlled by Republicans.141  Supermajorities have become more common and the median 
majority in state houses has risen from 22 seats to 29, while increasing in state senates from 9 
to 14 seats.142  These supermajorities have given more power to state governments and have 
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also given legislatures more authority to step in and get even more involved in federal law 
implementation in their respective states; some have described this era of enhanced 
partisanship as a basis for state and federal cooperation, as opposed to competition. 
 
Crossover Between State and Federal Lawmaking 
The framers of the constitution implemented a system of federalism which is a system 
of shared power between the federal (centralized) government and an intricate system of state 
governments, which as we now know can vary greatly.  Both the states and the federal 
government have their own individual powers, but they also have coexisting authorities, which 
aim to hold the checks and balances.143  There are dozens of issues that have significant overlap 
and shared power between states and the federal government.  Among the top most 
interrelating issue is healthcare, in which the federal government primarily uses policies at the 
state-level through federal aid programs, incentives, and grants.144     
The below case study will include two pieces of vastly substantial federal legislation and 
policies that required extensive work on behalf of the states in adherence and implementation 
of the laws.  Considering the following variables, full-time vs. part-time legislatures and 
partisanship at the state level, the case study examines the Affordable Care Act (passed in 
2010) and the expansion of Medicaid (part of the ACA, post 2010).  Through healthcare 
outcomes, results will show states with more professionalized legislatures have better 
                                                     





outcomes, are more prepared to respond to and implement federal law, and are more 
equipped to serve their constituencies.   
 
Case Study: Implementation of the Affordable Care Act at the State Level 
Introduction 
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law by 
President Barack Obama.  The goals of the 900-page law were to expand access to health 
insurance, increase consumer protections, emphasize prevention, improve quality and 
performance, and curb rising health care costs.145  However, the primary and overarching aim 
was to extend health insurance coverage to about 32 million uninsured Americans by 
expanding both private and public health insurance.146  Key provisions of the law included: 
Requiring businesses, with the exception of some smaller companies, to provide health 
insurance to their employees; requiring individuals to have health insurance (this is known as 
the “individual mandate”); and expanding Medicaid to cover people with incomes below 133 
percent of the federal poverty level.147  This was President Obama’s marquee health care law 
that had broad support amongst his fellow democrats and relatively no support from the 
opposition Republican Party.  Health care and policy analysts note that this was an immense 
law that had many levels of federal requirements for states, and as a result, much of the 
                                                     






responsibility for implementation fell to states and their respective legislative bodies.148  The 
case study examines two states, Massachusetts and Montana, and how each went about 
implementing the ACA.  These states were chosen because they show the spectrum of 
legislative professionalism, which had an immense impact on how and when the ACA was 
implemented at the state level; Massachusetts has a full-time legislature and Montana has one 
of the more part-time legislatures, meeting in voting sessions for only 90 days in each odd 
numbered year. 
 
Massachusetts Implementation of the ACA 
 As noted, the Massachusetts state legislature is a full-time, fully professionalized body 
that meets year-round.  Prior to the ACA’s passage, in 2006 the Commonwealth enacted what 
was called the Massachusetts Health Reform Initiative (MHRI).  This was meant to be a pilot 
program that would prepare the state for a federalized health insurance program.  Under 
Governor Mitt Romney, with support from the state legislature, the state implemented 
Medicaid expansion, subsidized private health insurance, a health insurance exchange, 
insurance market reforms and requirements, as well as an individual health insurance mandate 
for individuals.149   
One study surveyed Massachusetts health insurance outcomes leading up to the 2010 
passage of the affordable care act and showed by 2010 only 12.1 percent of the state’s adults 
                                                     
148 Shor, Boris. “Ideology, Party, and Opinion: Explaining Individual Legislator ACA Implementation Votes in the 
States.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 18, no. 4 (December 2018): 371–94. 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1532440018786734#articleCitationDownloadContainer. 
149 Long, Sharon K., and Karen Stockley. “The Impacts of State Health Reform Initiatives on Adults in New York and 




were not insured which was down 19.5 percent from 2006.150  The study goes on to note the 
state’s high levels of insurance coverage for individuals and amongst businesses endured 
throughout the implementation of the ACA in 2010 and beyond.  With expectations that the 
ACA would initially increase health care costs before they actually went down, the state’s full-
time legislature passed a bill called Chapter 224, An Act Improving the Quality of Health Care 
and Reducing Costs through Increased Transparency, Efficiency and Innovation.  This law, being 
the first of its kind, was a direct response to the ACA and was precisely aimed to establish a 
“legislative growth target” to control health care costs.151 
 
Montana Implementation of the ACA 
In contrast to Massachusetts, Montana has one of the nation’s most part-time state 
legislatures, meeting regularly for only 90 days in each odd numbered year.  Compared to 
Massachusetts, studies show the percentage of individuals who did not have health insurance 
in Montana was actually smaller; leading up to 2010, 15.7 percent were not insured in 2008 and 
16.1 percent were not insured in 2009.  However, due to a lack of legislative preparation, these 
numbers remained relatively stagnant and implementation of the ACA took longer to take 
effect and make an impact.152   
Figure 6 – Population without health insurance in Montana, 2004-2016 
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  Source: Ballotpedia.org 
 
Figure 2 shows that in 2014, in Montana, individual rates for those not on health insurance 
started to finally decline, dropping to 9.4 percent in 2015.  When the state opted to expand 
Medicaid in 2016, which placed them as one of the last states to enact this type of health care 
coverage expansion, non-coverage rates for individuals decreased dramatically – to 8.1 
percent.153  This decrease took place six years after the passage of the ACA, which was more 
than five years later than Massachusetts.  
 
Partisan Impact on ACA Implementation: Massachusetts vs. Montana  
 In many instances, federal law effectiveness at the state level is determined by how 
much capacity the state legislature has to be able to properly establish systems of 
implementation.  Traditionally, states controlled by Democratic state legislatures also have 
                                                     
153 I bid 
 
 54 
larger executive branch agencies and are more progressive thinking in nature.154  This is the 
case when comparing Massachusetts and Montana as Massachusetts, a heavily blue-leaning 
state with approximately 139,429 state government workers, and Montana, a red-leaning state 
with only 26,872 government employees.155  Given these states vary in population size, they are 
still on opposite ends of the state government size spectrum.   
This was clearly evident, post 2010, after the ACA was passed into law by Congress, as 
13 of 16 states to first to try their hand at ACA implementation had state legislatures with a 
Democrat Party majority.156  At the time (and still to this day) Massachusetts had a majority led 
Democratic state legislature and was one of these first 16 states to implement the ACA.  When 
states are considering how and when (really how fast) to implement a federal law, they must 
rely heavily on the will of their constituents – meaning, is this what the residents want?  
Massachusetts had already set the stage for this type of health care policy with its enormously 
successfully Health Reform Initiative that was implemented in 2006; the main takeaway, 
monthly premiums started to go down and health insurance options started to expand.157  
Democratic lawmakers in Massachusetts had precedent to stand on as they worked to expedite 
ACA implementation after it was passed by Congress in 2010.   
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To the contrary, the state of Montana had a Republican led state legislature when the 
ACA came to fruition and a much smaller state government infrastructure, as noted earlier.  
From the above case study, it’s clear that Montana took longer to implement the ACA, and two 
key elements from this delay were the lack of legislative professionalism and a lack of 
motivation to implement the health care law amongst the state’s Republican lawmakers.158  
Advocates for multiple years after the ACA’s passage in 2010, pushed for full implementation of 
the law, as well as for Medicaid expansion, which was one policy aspect of the ACA left entirely 
up to the states.159 
 
Case Study: Medicaid Expansion 
Introduction  
With the passage of the ACA in 2010, came the expansion of Medicaid, the federal 
government’s health insurance program for low income individuals and families.  This 
expansion essentially made the ACA the pillar of coverage for nearly all low-income residents.  
The new law redefined what it meant to be low-income under the ACA, expanding the eligibility 
to adults with incomes up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level.160  However, in 2012, the 
Supreme Court ruled on an aspect of the ACA’s constitutionality, stating “the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion [was] unconstitutionally coercive of states.”  This ruling largely and principally gave 
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the states the power to decide when and if they would expand Medicaid.161  The Supreme 
Court’s judgement created a vacuum of partisanship health care decision-making for states; 
this, combined with how full-time or part-time each state legislature is, made Medicaid 
expansion vary greatly in terms of timing and implementation.  This case study examines three 
different states that had varying timing for Medicaid expansion, while considering the variables 
of legislative professionalism and partisanship; California (2010), Minnesota (2014), and 
Montana (2016).   
 
California’s Medicaid Expansion 
 California, a Democratic-leaning state with a full-time state legislature opted to expand 
Medicaid through its Low-Income Health Plan (LIHP), which extended eligibility to a significantly 
larger group of low-income residents.162  The key part of this health care initiative expanded 
eligibility for Medicaid to people with incomes as high as 200% of the Federal Poverty Level.163  
California was one of the first five states to expand Medicaid and did so in a unique way, as the 
state legislature made expansions by county.  Beginning in November of 2010, California 
started to allow counties to offer expanded Medicaid while also receiving matching federal 
funds for covering those who were uninsured.164  The state found that for the counties that 
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chose to expand coverage, the out of pocket reporting costs dropped by 10 percentage points, 
almost immediately after implementation was complete.165   
 
Minnesota’s Medicaid Expansion 
 Minnesota, a state with a part-time (lawmakers meet 120 days each year), divided 
legislature (republicans control the State Senate, democrats control the House of the 
Representatives) voted to pass Medicaid expansion in late 2013.166  Since the legislature only 
meets 120 days during the year and the expansion was passed in February, implementation 
took place throughout the next year (2014).  The law elevated eligibility qualifications to 
families that were up to 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Level.167  The state figured the 
health care coverage expansion would only impact 35,000 families and individuals, but analysts 
determined in 2017 that since Medicaid expansion was passed, 222,900 more people were able 
to receive coverage in Minnesota.168  Although the state’s more moderate legislature did its job 
and acted within its capacity, its part-time professionalism clearly impacted how quickly it could 
enact Medicaid expansion.   
 
Montana’s Medicaid Expansion 
 Montana is a republican-leaning state with one of the most part-time, least 
professionalized state legislatures in the country, as the body meets only 90 every other year.  
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Montana was one of the last states to vote on and pass Medicaid expansion, as the state just 
recently implemented the health care initiative in 2016.169  The state originally sought a waiver 
to expand Medicaid in 2015 from the federal government, but since the legislature was not in 
session, the state could not act on it until the following year.  Since its implementation the 
program has been largely successful; as of April 2019, 95,246 Montana residents have enrolled 
in the expanded health care program.170  It’s important to note that Montana’s Medicaid 
expansion program differs from most, as it requires adults, under the age of 55 to work or 
participate in other community activities for at least 80 hours each month.171  Work 
requirements, such as the one Montana included, are traditionally part of more conservative-
leaning public policies.172   
 
Analysis 
 The relationship between the federal government and the states has always shifted over 
time.  It has shifted between different policy realms and shifts as varying presidential 
administrations come to power.  The majority political party in Congress has also changed 
substantially each decade.  These varying dynamics come and go, but what ultimately remains 
more constant is legislative professionalism, as well as partisanship, trends at the state level.  
Although states differ in terms of how part-time or full-time their state legislature is, these 
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lawmaking structures do not shift as much over time.  This variable of legislative 
professionalism is widely important, as it relates directly to the capacity a state has, or doesn’t 
have, to react to laws passed by the federal government.  Legislative professionalism, taken 
with state political partisanship trends, allows for federal laws to be implemented differently by 
each state. 
 Through the examination of marquee federal health care policies, including the 
Affordable Care Act and the expansion of Medicaid, this study showed that both legislative 
professionalism and partisanship, impacts how quickly a state can react to, implement, and 
adhere to federal law.  In the case of the ACA, Massachusetts, a majority Democratic state with 
a more full-time state legislature, had been implementing health care reforms leading up to the 
ACA’s passage and then was able to react quickly to implement the new federal law.  The state 
saw its uninsured rate go down almost immediately with health care outcomes improving as 
well.  Under the ACA, states could opt to expand Medicaid for lower-income individuals and 
families.  This was an important aspect of the law that challenged the relationship between 
many states and the federal government.  Almost immediately after the ACA was implemented 
in 2011, California, a Democratic-leaning state with a full-time state general assembly, opted 
into, and passed Medicaid expansion.  As a result, the Federal Poverty Level criteria to qualify 
for Medicaid increased to 200 percent, allowing for thousands of residents to get health care 
coverage.  
 Although the implementation of federal law varies and each law should be examined on 
a case by case basis, we must not shy away from the trends outlined in this study: as was the 
case with the ACA and Medicaid expansion, states with more full-time, and more Democratic-
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leaning state legislatures were able to respond to federal law faster, more vigorously, and with 






Varying in size, governmental makeup, functionality, and even what they are called (i.e. 
state legislature or general assembly) state legislatures have no uniform structure.  From this 
paper, we know this much is clear.  These characteristics, alone and together, do have an 
immense bearing on how laws are considered and passed.  However, the variance in legislative 
professionalism throughout the 50 states is the greatest contributor to legislative impact on 
policy implementation.  Case studies from the previous two chapters revealed that in both 
instances, the more professionalized legislatures were able to keep state level executive 
branches in check, were able to balance the federal government’s vast and far reaching power, 
and were able to be nimble enough to react and so their constituents could reap the benefits of 
new laws, such as the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid expansion.   
 In chapter one, the various aspects of state legislative makeup were examined by 
comparing different legislative bodies throughout the United States.  Through comparative 
analysis, this chapter dove into the depths of state legislatures and revealed the real meaning 
behind legislative professionalism.  Following past research, it broke states into three distinct 
categories, in terms of their legislative professionalism – full-time, part-time, and hybrid.  This 
chapter defined these terms as the following: A “part-time legislature,” is a body that operates 
less than year-round, has minimal to no support staff, and its elected officials are paid less than 
a living wage; a “full-time legislature” functions year-round with full-time staff, and elected 




 In terms of their professionalism, nearly half of the states operate under hybrid state 
legislatures.  Massachusetts, California, and New York have the nation’s most full-time 
legislatures, while Alaska, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin have legislative 
bodies setup so members spend roughly 80 percent of the work week (9 a.m. to 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday) working on state legislative matters.  The remainder of the states, 
spend less than two thirds of regular working hours on matters of state business and legislation, 
and the legislatures in the states of Arkansas, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon and 
Texas hold voting sessions only every other year.173  State legislators that spend more time on 
the job and those that have more adequate staff are able to do more detailed research and, as 
a result, are able to craft more meaningful pieces of legislation that create more impactful 
change. 
Chapter two answered the following question: How does legislative professionalism and 
political makeup of state executive branches impact how laws and policies are implemented at 
the state level?  A case study of healthcare policy, specifically during the immediate years after 
the Affordable Care Act was passed (2010), focused on four scenarios of divided and non-
divided state governments (Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Texas).  It showed 
the less professionalized state legislatures, most notably Texas, were at a disadvantage and 
were unable to provide a substantial enough power balance compared to their respective 
executive branch (governor).      
Chapter three answered a similar question, does the full-time career nature of state 
legislatures and political makeup of state governance, each alone and taken together, have an 




impact on how federal laws and policies are implemented or impacted at the state level?  
Focusing exclusively on the relationship between state legislatures and the federal government, 
this chapter had comparable findings to chapter two.  It found more full-time, and more 
Democratic-leaning state legislatures, specifically Massachusetts and California, were able to 
respond to federal law with more authority and purpose.   
 As stated above, the majority of state legislatures spend less than two thirds of regular 
work time on issues of state legislation, with a handful of states meeting only every other year.  
Some reasoning behind why various state legislatures were slower to react to ACA 
implementation and Medicaid expansion, was simply because they were not in session, 
meaning under their legislative rules, lawmakers were not slated to vote formally until later in 
the year or even the following year.  The question to be asked is, why?  Why don’t all states 
have legislative bodies that operate on a more full-time, year-round basis?  Why are there not 
clear-cut standards to state lawmaking?  Of course, guidelines are written into state 
constitutions and are explained in state legislative rules.  Of course, changing these state 
legislative structures and makeup would take significant state-level amending.  And lastly, of 
course state independence from the federal government is what the constitution’s framers 
sought.  That being said, these are still serious questions and issues that deserve more 
attention.  The benefits of legislative professionalism are clear, but the lack of an appetite in 
most states to shift to being more full-time, is simply just not there.  As discussed in chapter 
one, the last significant push from advocates for states to become more professionalized was 
back in the 1980s.      
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 Much of what this paper is about, especially chapters two and three, is how federal 
policy can be interpreted and then implemented at the state level.  This type of in depth 
research has not really been explored since Shep Melnick’s Between the Lines (1994) which 
examines how statutory interpretation has affected the development of various national public 
benefit programs at the state level.  The research in this paper dives into how the ACA – a major 
public benefit program – is implemented at the state level while also considering variables of 
legislative professionalism, partisanship, and divided governments.  Although this paper did 
include two case studies that examined how states implemented federal healthcare policies, it 
did not dive into other important policy realms and concepts that deserve more research.  
There are many overlapping policies between the federal government and the states that 
should be examined as it relates to legislative professionalism and state-level ability to act and 
react.  That being said, there is one example that seemingly unfolded parallel to the COVID-19 
pandemic during 2020.  After the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis at the knee of a police 
officer on May 25, 2020, there was a surge across the United States (and in parts of the world) 
in civil unrest, protests, and advocacy for reform in policing and progress to be made in 
communities, specifically in local law enforcement, to curbing institutional racism.  A poll from 
July 8, 2020 showed 90 percent of Americans believe that racism and police violence are 
significant problems with nearly two-thirds stating their general support for some kind of 
reform in policing.174  In response, the Trump Administration dragged its feet and congress 
unable to form a cohesive solution, there has been immense pressure on state lawmakers to 
                                                     
174 "Nine out of 10 Americans Say Racism and Police Brutality Are Problems, Poll Finds." The Guardian. July 08, 
2020. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/08/americans-racism-police-brutality-problems-poll.  
 
 65 
urgently create change.  In the months following the death of Floyd, 16 states have introduced 
or passed bills that address some form of change in police standards.175  Although this is a 
significant step in the right direction, approximately half of the state legislatures were not even 
in session and therefore unable to consider possible proposals that most likely would have 
generally been supported by constituents.176  Unfortunately, these proposals will have to be 
taken up at a later date and formal votes would have to wait until the next time these 
legislatures are in session, which could be months later.   
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, the COVID-19 pandemic has had an 
outsized impact on the United States.  When cases began to surge across the country in late 
March and as they continued to rise throughout 2020, the importance of state-level lawmaking 
became clear.  Further, with Washington D.C. in continued partisan gridlock and again 
combined with a limited overall response to the pandemic from the Trump Administration, the 
ability of state legislatures to be able to react in a timely manner and implement new laws 
seems to be at an all-time high.  The research and case studies in this paper, warrant at the very 
least, a consideration for implementing nationwide standards for state legislative 
professionalism so that states can react with certainty and real lawmaking authority in the face 
of crisis.  The federal government, including congress, should take the immediate steps of 
enacting a grant and training program that states can apply or opt into, that would educate and 
                                                     
175 Li, Weihua, and Humera Lodhi. "Which States Are Taking on Police Reform After George Floyd?" The Marshall 





bring awareness to state officials on the benefits of enhanced legislative professionalism in 
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